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Can NATO’s new Very High Readiness 
Joint Task force deter?  
 
Jens Ringsmose & Sten Rynning1
When NATO-allies met at their Wales summit in September 
2014, the D-word was back in vogue. Not in a muttering, shy 
or implicit way, but unambiguously and straightforward. 
For the first time in more than two decades NATO’s heads of 
states and governments openly discussed how best to “deter” 
a distinct strategic rival – Russia. 
Chief among the Welsh summit initiatives was the decision to 
set up a new multinational spearhead force – the Very High 
Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) – as part of an enhanced 
NATO Response Force (NRF) and within the framework of a 
so-called Readiness Action Plan (RAP). The VJFT will likely 
be announced an “operational capacity” at NATO’s coming 
summit in Warsaw, in July 2016, as an indicator of a serious 
approach to deterrence.
Concomitantly, the United States has greatly expanded and 
extended its so-called European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) 
that was launched in 2014 as a response to Russia’s annexa-
tion of Crimea. From early 2017, an armored American army 
brigade will be present in Eastern Europe on a “persistent 
rotational” basis with its heavy gear pre-positioned in Europe. 
This will bring the US land force presence in Europe up to two 
permanently stationed brigades and one that rotates in nine 
out of twelve months. The US air force and navy will maintain 
their enhanced presence (in effect, defer planned withdraw-
als for as long as it takes) and be particularly visible in the 
Baltic and Black Sea areas. 
The Alliance has taken important first steps toward estab-
lishing credible deterrence, but it needs to do more. Credible 
deterrence requires not only adequate military capacities, 
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such as the VJTF; it equally requires a proper doctrine that 
pulls the capacities credible together and then a culture 
of decision-making and communication that establishes 
NATO’s reputation for resolve. Capacities, doctrine, and 
culture – these are key dimensions of NATO’s deterrence 
posture. We shall examine them in turn and pinpoint where 
NATO has work to do. 
Capacity: The VJTF and the “Enhanced NRF”
Since Wales, NATO’s leadership has repeatedly trumpeted 
the VJTF as a rapid response force that will substantially 
enhance the Alliance’s ability to counter military aggression 
against its members. Unfortunately, this involves a stretch 
of imagination. The VJTF might be quicker and punch with 
greater weight than yesterday’s force, but it is still far too 
small to prevent a determined Russia from moving into, 
say, Latvia. Despite the magnificent headlines – “adapta-
tion”, “the biggest reinforcement of our collective defense” 
and “force enhancement” – the VJTF does not represent a 
dramatic break with what NATO is already doing in military 
terms. The VJTF adds readiness but not much real muscle to 
NATO and is in this sense mostly old wine in new bottles.
True, when fully implemented the new Enhanced NRF (of 
which the VJTF will be the high-readiness element) will 
appear to be three times as strong as yesterday’s quick reac-
tion force, the old NRF. As announced by NATO’s secretary 
general, Jens Stoltenberg, the Enhanced NRF will consist of 
up to 40,000 personnel, while the rapidly deployable parts 
of the pre-Wales NRF (the so-called Immediate Response 
Force – IRF) consisted of about 13,000 personnel. 
However, to get to the “up to 40,000 personnel”, NATO 
has resorted to somewhat creative bookkeeping. When the 
Alliance counted its high-readiness forces before Wales, it 
focused solely on the 13,000 troops that were on “stand-by” 
as part of the IRF – not the 13,000 personnel that were pre-
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paring to be part of the IRF the next year (standing up), nor 
the 13,000 personnel that had just been on stand-by as part 
of the NRF the year before (standing down). 
The new Enhanced NRF really does two things. First, it 
speeds up the reaction time of the stand-by forces (the spear-
head 13,000). Second, it puts the other two teams on call 
for deployment – the 13,000 personnel training for stand-
by and the 13,000 personnel winding down after stand-by. 
Together these latter approximately 26,000 troops will be 
labeled the “Initial Follow On Forces Group” – or IFFG. The 
IFFG are meant to be “high-readiness forces that deploy 
quickly following the VJTF, in response to a crisis.” In real-
ity, the IFFG will be able to deploy within 30-45 days, which 
hardly makes it a “high-readiness force”.
To be fair, the new NRF is a more agile military tool than 
its predecessor. While troop numbers have certainly been 
somewhat artificially inflated, the VJTF and the IFFG are on 
much higher alert than the old NRF. Parts of the VJTF will be 
ready for deployment within 48 hours; the old IRF needed 
a full month (30 days) to deploy. Moreover, both the VJTF 
and the IFFG will be subjected to a much more rigorous and 
demanding training program than the old NRF. Future NRF-
rotations will see many more snap-exercises and short notice 
inspections. Being on higher alert will unquestionably make 
the new NRF a more relevant tool; it might be noted that it 
likewise will make it a lot more expensive.
What is really new about NATO’s spearhead force is not the 
projected (modest) military improvements, however, but the 
fact that the NRF is for the first time being linked explicitly 
to collective defense and thus Article 5. Since its creation in 
2002, the NRF was always perceived as a vehicle for transfor-
mation and – if need be – an operational capacity for out-of-
area operations. The latter contingency never materialized, 
though NRF units on a couple of occasions were deployed—
to offer emergency relief in Pakistan or protect Olympic sites 
in Greece. The NRF, though modeled on a US Marine Expe-
ditionary Brigade, lacked operational purpose, not least as 
it unfolded in the shadow of the war in Afghanistan that 
sucked up the allies’ defense energy. 
Russia’s actions in Ukraine have convinced policymakers 
that the eastern-most allies need assurances (and Russia 
deterrence), and the political reframing of the NRF became 
the obvious answer. As the alliance’s geostrategic pendulum 
swung back towards “regional NATO”, so did the NRF, which 
thus gained a real operational purpose for the first time. The 
next question is whether the Alliance can shape the right 
doctrine for the new force. 
Doctrine: Back to deterrence
Deterrence is a question of sending a strong signal to would-
be aggressors – such as Russia – that the NATO realm is 
off limits. Deterrence can take distinctively different forms, 
though.
The politically convenient option for NATO is “deterrence 
by denial” – by which NATO would deny Russia access to its 
territory and riches. The political appeal lies in the promise 
of upholding the inviolability – the sanctuary – of all NATO 
territory. It is the equivalent of building a wall so high that 
Russia would be discouraged from climbing it. It involves 
three things. First a potent NATO force on the eastern bor-
der, deployed, ready and strong enough to respond to Rus-
sian aggression and dig in and fight. Second a prepared 
insurgency for the eventuality that Russian forces penetrate 
part of the border in order to deny them the ability to settle 
in. Finally a capacity to move people and capital out of the 
contested area so that Russia would not be able to count on 
capturing riches. 
There are at least two problems with this option of denial. 
One concerns the intensity of Russian interests. If Rus-
sia were really set on capturing one or several of the Baltic 
states, it probably would not be dissuaded by the prospect of 
an insurgency and the loss of some riches. These two dimen-
sions thus fall out of the equation. 
That means that “denial” depends almost uniquely on 
NATO’s forward deployed forces, and the fact of the matter 
is that they simply will not attain the strength to provide for 
in-place deterrence. NATO is unwilling to forward deploy 
anything as large as or larger than a brigade (around 5,000 
troops) – which would not only violate the NATO-Russia 
Founding Act of 1997 (which NATO prefers to keep intact to 
occupy the moral high ground) and be expensive for western 
taxpayers, it would risk pulling Western troops into a static 
forward-posture inappropriate for the dynamic threats and 
risks emanating not only from Russia but also other parts of 
the world. 
NATO must therefore fall back on the other option of “deter-
rence by punishment.” In this scenario NATO accepts that 
part of its domain – say, the Baltic states – are vulnerable 
to Russian aggression, but it promises to meet such aggres-
sion with a response in some other place – Kaliningrad, 
Murmansk, or event Vladivostok out east – so fierce that 
Russia will desist. It should be noted that the new NRF is a 
tripwire—as is the American forces deployed as part of the 
European Reassurance Initiative, and as are the European 
forces that soon will be deployed on permanent rotation to 
the frontline allies as part of NATO’s new Enhanced Forward 
Presence initiative—that can bring the hammer to blow: it 
will move quickly to border areas of concern and confront 
Russia, which would have the muscle to defeat the force—kill 
it, to put it bluntly—but knowing that such aggression would 
cause NATO to bring its hammer to bear. 
The tricky part for NATO is to define its hammer. This ham-
mer must consist of follow-on forces – not the IFFG, which is 
part of the tripwire, but the whole package of NATO forces, 
both conventional and nuclear. A hammer is big and there-
fore both expensive and politically controversial, though in 
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different measures. NATO could organize a mass of con-
ventional forces and tie them into the overall doctrine of 
deterrence. This conventional option would be expensive at 
a scale that dwarfs the VJTF expenditure, which is already 
impressive. Inversely, NATO could fall back on nuclear 
deterrence, which is much more affordable but frankly 
beyond the pale of some allies. 
NATO is ultimately likely to opt for a mix of forces– it’s 
“defense and deterrence posture review” of 2012 talks of 
an “appropriate mix of conventional and nuclear capa-
bilities,” and this ambiguous wording is likely to endure. 
Ambiguity can help NATO foster an internal compromise, 
and it can keep Russia guessing, which can be good for 
deterrence. But there should be no mistaking: as NATO 
cannot do “deterrence by denial,” it must confront the fact 
that “deterrence by punishment” defines the inescapable 
element in its deterrence posture. Creative ambiguity might 
in this regard suffice for its public diplomacy, but because 
Russia will know how to distinguish between public diplo-
macy and capacity, NATO must develop a real punishment 
option. 
Culture: Establishing NATO’s Reputation for Resolve 
Soft power is really the backbone of the construct of deter-
rence, if by soft power we understand the capacity to convey 
resolve. We shall briefly discuss two facets of this soft deter-
rent power – decision-making and strategic communica-
tion. They tie in with a third facet, namely public opinion. 
Worryingly for NATO governments, public opinion in some 
key allied countries are turning against the idea that their 
country should come to the defense of other allies. Policy-
makers should take this erosion of public support very seri-
ously, and clear policy in regards to decision-making and 
strategic communication can help them do so.
Decision-making at NATO level is basically about speed and 
credibility. Speedy decisions are of essence if the VJTF is to 
move into a danger zone within 48 hours (NATO military 
authorities can assemble the force but political approval is 
necessary for its deployment and engagement). NATO can 
prepare its decision-making by improving its “early warn-
ing indicators,” but ultimately it comes down to the ability 
of each ally to establish a fast-track procedure for approval 
in the national capital, especially if parliamentary approval 
is required. This ties into a wider question of defining the 
procedures for activating the VJTF: the Alliance is de facto 
beset by disagreement about when to activate the force. 
Unsurprisingly, eastern allies have argued in favor of early 
deployment when there is trouble on the distant horizon, 
while for mostly political and economic reasons some West 
European countries prefer “last minute” activation. 
These issues of speedy decision-making involve another 
tricky matter, namely the transit of other NATO forces and 
especially their lethal equipment. Obviously, speedy deci-
sions matter little if forces cannot move. In peacetime the 
movement of forces and equipment across borders is near 
impossible on account of “dangerous goods” legislation. 
According to NATO officials, the Alliance is making head-
way in regard to national procedures allowing for force and 
military equipment transit. Still, there is some way to go to 
realize the type of “military Schengen zone” that the com-
mander of US Army Europe, General Hodges, in late 2015 
called for. 
Next is the question of decision-making credibility. It begins 
with an identification of vital interests – or perhaps more 
commonly, red lines. These should be clearly identified 
(i.e., no violation of NATO borders) but painted in broad 
strokes to leave the adversary guessing (i.e., leave open 
the specific response to small incursions). The adversary 
should be of the impression that the hammer that could fall 
on him is exceptionally forceful (i.e., in the logic of deter-
rence by punishment), which is to say that all options must 
be kept on the table.
The worst-case scenario begins with NATO authorities 
taking some options off the table because they are uncom-
fortable with them – such as the nuclear option. It then con-
tinues with a very detailed red line that NATO authorities in 
fact are unwilling to defend and therefore willing to nego-
tiate. And a cumbersome decision-making process tops it 
off. Russia would perceive these weaknesses and, assur-
edly, exploit them. All this is to say that NATO has to get its 
decision-making culture right if its investments in military 
hardware and doctrine are going to be worth their while. 
Finally, culture in the broader sense of strategic communi-
cation is likewise of essence. Modern conflict takes place in 
a very fundamental way in the cognitive domain. We saw it 
earlier in regards to dwindling NATO public opinion polls. It 
goes also for the key publics of the conflicts in which NATO 
or NATO allies are involved – be it Ukrainians, Muslims 
drawn to Islamic State, or Pashtuns. They likely experience 
NATO as reactive and disconnected from their social and 
political reality. When NATO’s messaging gets online, it is 
far distanced by more agile adversaries’ command of media 
and narratives. NATO – as in all NATO governments in 
addition to NATO staff in Brussels – must become more apt 
at identifying and communicating to these key publics to 
explain why their grievances may be justified, what NATO 
can do to help, and why grievances are vulnerable to the 
manipulation sought by actors in confrontation with NATO. 
Conclusion: Anticipating the 2016 Warsaw Summit
At their Warsaw Summit, NATO-allies will discuss whether 
the Readiness Action Plan (RAP) that was adopted in Wales 
suffices. The discussion will once again center around assur-
ance and adaption measures, and it will, at least implicitly, 
involve different positions on how to deter Russia. 
The allies closest to Russia will argue in favor of a RAP II. 
These nations are not squeamish when it comes to violating 
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the NATO-Russian Founding Act of 1997, and they would 
prefer a move toward more “deterrence by denial” and the 
permanent deployment of substantial combat troops in 
Eastern Europe. According to officials in NATO Headquar-
ters, this demand is to some extent backed by the United 
States as Washington is seeking to make NATO-Europe take 
greater responsibility for European security. A measure thus 
being considered is the aforementioned Enhanced Forward 
Presence, meaning concretely the deployment of four-to-six 
non-US NATO battalions to Eastern Europe. Other nations 
will maintain that the already existing RAP – or RAP I – is 
enough. As always with NATO, it will probably end with a 
compromise, but a compromise influenced mainly by the 
Alliance’s major powers. The likely outcome is a RAP 1.5 
with a tilt toward trip-wire forces and “deterrence by pun-
ishment”.
We should also expect to see the allies commence a difficult 
discussion about NATO’s long-term relationship with Rus-
sia. Although NATO and Russia is again meeting within the 
framework of the NATO-Russia Council, it is highly unlikely 
that the Alliance and Russia can establish a new strategic 
partnership anytime soon. However, neither NATO nor 
Moscow has an interest in a tense military standoff imbued 
that threatens to spin out of control. So while deterrence is 
back in vogue, we will likely soon encounter a new round of 
diplomacy intended to revive Pierre Harmel’s old formula of 
deterrence and dialogue/détente. 
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